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**V.M.GARSHIN:
A PIONEER OF DIRECT INTERIOR MONOLOGUE¹**

Vsevolod M. Garshin's story "Four Days" ("Четыре дня") made the author famous when it was published in 1877. Intended as a strong anti-war statement and based on a true incident during the Russo-Turkish war (1877–78), "Four Days" is the interior monologue of a wounded soldier left for dead on an empty battlefield. His last name, Ivanov, which is traditionally considered to be the most common one in Russia, may suggest the idea of "everyman" in order to generalize the protagonist's terrible experience on the battlefield into a broad anti-war message. The protagonist finds himself pinned down next to the body of a Turkish soldier whom he had killed just before being wounded. Forced to look at the corpse for a long time, Ivanov experiences terrible guilt, since he has never killed before. After four days of physical and mental agony, during which Ivanov reassesses his formerly idealistic attitude toward war and ends up condemning it as something far from glorious and noble, the protagonist is found by his regiment, and, unlike his real-life prototype, he survives (Henry, 47). Throughout the text we do not leave the confines of the protagonist's mind; as a result, the intense, relentless focus on his mental and physical anguish created by the interior monologue: immobilized by his wound, he becomes a prisoner of his own mind; as a result, the intense, relentless focus on his mental and physical anguish created by the interior monologue technique enhances the "horrors of war" effect intended by the author. At the same time the war-related situation and setting provide motivation for the wounded man's interior monologue: immobilized by his wound, he becomes a prisoner of his own mind and is therefore forced by circumstances to think through his entire predicament and its causes. P. Varnai sums up this type of form-content symbiosis in this and other Garshin's works:

The writings of Garshin are representative of the 1880s (a transitional period between the utilitarian practices of the sixties and early seventies on the one hand and the great aesthetic revival of the end of the century on the other) in that they combine tradition with experimentation. (61)

From the perspective of literary history the importance of Garshin's short story has to do not so much with its anti-war message as with the innovative nature of the technique used to convey that message. In "Four Days" Garshin was, to the best of my knowledge, the first to explore the potential of *direct interior monologue*: a genre, which seeks to create the artistic illusion that the reader is eavesdropping on a character's private communication process in the form of inner discourse *without any mediation on the part of a narrator*. The idea of creating the illusion of inner discourse without narratorial mediation had been raised by Dostoevsky in 1876 in a short story entitled "A Gentle Creature" ("Кроткая"). However, as D. Cohn argues, Dostoevsky's story, which is supposed to represent the stenographic record of thoughts going through the head of a man whose wife has just committed suicide, "still very largely conforms to the norms of traditional first-person narration" (1978, 180) and therefore does not constitute enough of a formal break with conventional narrative. In any case, regardless of what one thinks of "A Gentle Creature", Garshin was dealing with an unexplored genre, and to quote L. Stenborg: "diese Novelle ist als einer der ersten Versuche des sog. inneren Monologs betrachtet worden." (127). And it is because Garshin's text initiated many of the devices later used by such masters of the genre as J. Joyce and W. Faulkner, that the form of "Four Days" merits a close analysis.

At the same time, it must be stressed that since Garshin's story was such a pioneering work and in my opinion represents the *birth* of direct interior monologue as we know it today, it is by no means uniform in the way it seeks to represent an on-going thought process. Given the absence of a genre tradition in this area, it is quite understandable that Garshin's text seems to vacillate between a) a form required by the premise that we are eavesdropping on a private thought process and b) more traditional forms related to conventional first-person narrative. Therefore, my discussion will be an attempt to determine to what extent "Four Days" succeeds in creating the illusion of private communication.

I would like to begin my consideration of Garshin's text by isolating the literary genre in question: direct interior monologue (hereinafter termed *DIM*). DIM is best understood in relation to its counterpart: *indirect interior monologue*. Indirect interior monologue, as R. Humphrey points out, is the thought process of a literary character in the form of inner discourse, which is framed or presented by a narrator (24). The degree of narratorial mediation can vary. For example, the narrator's voice and spatiotemporal position may blend with those of a character, which results in *Free Indirect Discourse* or *Erlebte Rede*.² This technique, which F. Stänzel defines as "the combination of the speech, the perception or the thought of a fictional character with the voice of the narrator as teller ..." (219) was used by L. Tolstoy and G. Flaubert, and it has become a very widespread

form of modern narrative. W. Schmid views this type of mixed discourse as Textinterferenz, a term, which he uses to designate the blending of the *Personentext* (the position of a character *experiencing* the events) and the *Erzählertext* (the position of a narrator *recounting* the events): "Diese Vermischung der Merkmale für die beiden Texte nenne ich Interferenz von Erzählertext und Personentext oder – kürzer – Textinterferenz. Ihre bekanntesten Formen sind die indirekte Rede (nur der Teil, der die Rede der Person wiedergibt) und die sogenannte 'erlebte Rede'." (45). The narrator can also be present only as a frame *around* segments of a character's inner discourse, thereby giving the reader some kind of orientation by providing an explanatory context for a thought process otherwise not intended for an external addressee. A famous example of this form of indirect interior monologue can be found in J. Joyce's *Ulysses* where Bloom's and Stephen's respective inner discourse is periodically interrupted by a narrator who relates what these characters are doing at the moment.

In contrast to these approaches, DIM, such as Garshin's "Four Days," strives to exclude narratorial presence or mediation altogether: there is no narrative voice *presenting* the thoughts of a character, no organizing force filtering the inner discourse of a protagonist and no teller or guide putting the interior monologue of a "thinker" into some kind of explanatory context. Placing this type of discourse into the category of pure *Personentext*, W. Schmid argues that "der innere Monolog als solcher keineswegs mit der erlebten Rede oder anderen Interferenzphänomenen identisch ist [...] ist ein sprachlich mehr oder weniger ausgeformter Bewußtseinsvorgang in der Ich-Form gehalten und sind alle Merkmale dieser ausgedehnten inneren Rede auf die Bedeutungsposition und die raum-zeitliche Origo dieses Ich bezogen [...] können wir nach Analogie zur direkten Rede von einem direkten inneren Monolog sprechen." (58–9) And it is this direct, unmediated and monophonic nature of DIM that makes possible the creation of the most vivid illusion of eavesdropping on a *private* thought process.³

The key concept here is the illusion of *private*, as opposed to *public*, communication. Private communication, i.e., non-written inner discourse aimed onto one but the self, can be suggested by a literary text only *in contrast* to such common forms of public communication as conventional first-person narration, i.e. usually written discourse intended for a reader. Therefore, if the latter tends to be explicit and is characterized by completeness and coherence, the illusion of self-communication can be achieved when explicitness, coherence and completeness are avoided as much as possible. In other words, unless otherwise motivated, the less a DIM sounds like conventional narrative, the more "realistic" it appears. This is borne out by the evolution of the genre: Molly Bloom's interior monologue at the end of Joyce's *Ulysses*, considered by many to be the finest example of DIM, appears to be intended for no one but the thinker precisely because it sounds nothing like narration or any other kind of public discourse. The same

can said about the first two parts of W. Faulkner's *The Sound and Fury*. This is why D. Cohn contends that DIM is "Paradoxically, a non-narrative form of fiction" and goes on to explain that

the most majority of first-person novels ... present themselves as written memoirs (like *David Copperfield* or *Felix Krull*), or as spoken discourse subsequently recorded by a listener (i.e., framed, like Joseph Conrad's novels, or *The Immoralist*). In autonomous monologue [DIM – V.T.] this realistic motivation of the text's origin is canceled out by the very nature of the genre: it can create the illusion that it renders the unrolling of thought *only if it effaces the illusion of a causal link between this language and written text.* (1978, 174–75, underlined by me – V.T.)⁴

Thus, we have two different communicative premises in DIM and in narration respectively: the former implies that the addresser and addressee are the same person, while the latter does the opposite. And it is in the way that it deals with this question that Garshin's text often appears ambiguous: at times lapsing into a narratorial style, "Four Days" often appears to rest on the private and public communication premises simultaneously. This creates communicative ambiguity, which is indicative of the difficulties often associated with exploring a new literary genre.

In spite of the text's numerous narratorial features, which will be addressed below, Garshin introduced at least one major innovative device in "Four Days", which sets this story apart from conventional narration: the use of the punctual present in the main story-line. According to D. Cohn, this form of the present tense "synchronizes verbalization with action or experience" (1978, 191), and even though the illusion of absolute synchronization is not always achieved in Garshin's story, we have a clear sense that an attempt is being made to do so. Thus, in a number of instances Ivanov's verbalization and experience are close enough to create the sense that the action in "Four Days" is "here and now", which comes into sharp contrast with the inevitably retrospective stance of the *conventional* narrator. For example, in the following passage we have the distinct impression that the narrator's inner discourse renders his perceptual process as it occurs, i.e., *in actu*:

Я проснулся. Почему я вижу звезды, которые так ярко светятся на черно-синем болгарском небе? Разве я не в палатке? [...] Надо мною – клочок черно-синего неба, на котором горит большая звезда и несколько маленьких, вокруг что-то темное и высокое. Это кусты. Я в кустах: меня не нашли.⁵

In order to assess the significance of Garshin's attempt to use the punctual present tense in his DIM, let us return to the above-mentioned assumption made by Cohn that the discourse of a conventional first-person narrator is modelled on various forms of *non-fictional* writing or speech, i.e., a communication situation where the addresser and the addressee are *different* individuals. This premise implies that narration, which is normally defined as discourse relating two or more sequentially-arranged events (Rimmon-Kenan, 2cf), has to be retro-spectively oriented: its logical tense must be the *past* or sometimes the *evocative present*, which, unlike the *punctual present*, is a retrospectively-oriented tense used in order to give more vividness to events (Cohn, 1978, 190–203). It would be illogical for a writing narrator to use the punctual present, which "synchronizes verbalization with action or experience" (cf. Cohn above), since he can write down his account of events only *after* they happen. And it would make even less sense for a speaking narrator to use the punctual present, since it would imply that he is relating events taking place right before his listener's eyes, which unless the listener is blind, is a waste of effort. It is only when the addresser and the addressee are the same person, as is the case in DIM, that the punctual present becomes logically acceptable: the thinker is not *narrating* but *registering* his experience in the form of inner discourse or verbalization.⁶ In this respect Cohn writes: "This employment of the present tense pinpoints the simultaneity of language and happening that distinguishes the new form [DIM–V.T.] from 'the previous form of narrative' in the first person, where language always follows happening." (1978, 173). This is why Garshin's "Four Days" is so innovative: even though the thinker's style is narratorial in many ways, it represents an attempt at a fundamental break with *narrative as a communicative situation* because the author clearly seeks to eliminate retrospection from the main story-line by closing the temporal gap between *histoire* and *discours* (to use E. Benveniste's terminology), i.e. between the protagonist's experience and its verbalization (Cohn, 1978, 188–90).

In addition to placing Garshin's text within the realm of DIM and distancing it from conventional first-person narrative, the use of the present tense and the related absence of general retrospection play another important role in "Four Days." In a story where the protagonist's life is in grave danger – Ivanov is wounded and immobilized under the hot sun in the middle of nowhere – present-tense DIM creates the kind of suspense that is virtually impossible to achieve in traditional first-person (retrospective) narrative. In the latter the very fact of narration normally indicates that the hero has *survived* to tell the tale, and no matter how much internal focalization is used – for example, often suspense is heightened when the perspective of the experiencing self is adopted at the expense of the "what-next" knowledge of the narrating self – the reader still knows that "I was about to die" usually implies "but I didn't."⁷ Present-tense DIM inevitably excludes such a

comforting guarantee. In Garshin's text we are given only the "here and how" perspective of the experiencing self because *there is no narrating self* to begin with and therefore no solace of a retrospective point of view. When Garshin's protagonist thinks: "Да, я ранен в бою. Опасно или нет?" (28), we know that these wounds could be fatal – in most conventional first-person narratives they cannot – and therefore we are keenly aware that this character may "just die on us."⁸ This results in greater suspense and a keener sense of empathy; we can identify more easily with someone who does not know his future because we do not know ours. Perhaps this feature has the potential of making a story with an adventure communicated in present-tense DIM more "adventurous" than the same story presented in the conventional retrospective narrative mode.

Given all that, I must once again stress the pioneering nature of Garshin's DIM and the associated difficulty of working with a new fictional premise, since the punctual present is not used consistently throughout the thinker's verbalization of on-going experience. At times Ivanov lapses into a retrospective style by using what amounts to the evocative present and even the purely narratorial past. For example, here is the protagonist's first record of his initial physical sensations after regaining consciousness on the empty battlefield.

Я никогда не находился в таком странном положении. Я лежу, кажется, на животе и вижу перед собою только маленький кусочек земли. Несколько травинок, муравей, ползущий с одной из них вниз головою, какие-то кусочки сора от прошлогодней травы – вот весь мой мир. И вижу я его только одним глазом, потому что другой зажат чем-то твердым, должно быть веткою, на которую опирается моя голова. Мне ужасно неловко, и я хочу, но решительно не понимаю, почему не могу, шевельнуться. Так проходит время. Я слышу треск кузнечиков, жужжание пчелы. Больше нет ничего. Наконец я делаю усилие, освобождаю правую руку из-под себя и, упираясь обеими руками о землю, хочу встать на колени. (27–8)

Until "так проходит время" we have the impression that Ivanov's mental discourse and his physical experience are *intended* by the author to appear simultaneous, which means that this is the punctual present, and we are outside the realm of retrospective discourse: the thinker is not narrating but merely registering the external world. However, the moment "так проходит время" appears, a *summary* effect is introduced, i.e., the present tense is now *evocative*, since such a statement implies that the thinker is looking back on events and summing up or taking stock of the situation. The end of the above-cited passage is even more narratorial, since the adverb "наконец я делаю усилие" implies that the thinker sees this particular action as the end of a series, and it is only in

retrospect, i.e., in narrative, that one can classify anything into sets and determine what element is the last.⁹

In some places Ivanov's discourse is even more ambiguous as to the thinker's temporal position with respect to the events in the main story-line. In the following passage the thinker goes from the illusion of "the simultaneity of language and happening" to narrative in the past tense and back again:

Солнце взойшло. Его огромный диск, весь пересеченный и разделенный черными ветвями кустов, красен, как кровь. Сегодня будет, кажется, жарко. Мой сосед (reference to the nearby dead Turk killed by Ivanov) – что станет с тобой? Ты и теперь ужасен.

Да, он был ужасен. Его волосы начали выпадать. Его кожа, черная от природы, побледнела и пожелтела; раздутое лицо натянуло ее до того, что она лопнула за ухом. Там копошились черви. Ноги, затянутые в штiblеты, раздулись, и между крючками штiblета выплезли огромные пузыри. И весь он раздулся горою. Что сделает с ним солнце сегодня? Лежать так близко к нему невыносимо.

Я должен отползти во что бы то ни стало. Но смогу ли я?
(34f)

The use of the future sense in "сегодня будет, кажется, жарко" and in "что делает с ним солнце сегодня?" clearly indicates that the narrator cannot be looking back on this scene. And this illusion of simultaneous discourse and experience is even more evident from the punctual present tense in the reference to the sun: "Его огромный диск [...] красен как кровь" and the mental address to the dead Turk: "Ты и теперь ужасен." However, the sudden shift into the narratorial past indicates that the author is still groping for the right technique in this unexplored genre, unsure of the means necessary to maintain the communicative illusion of DIM.

As the text progresses, this vacillation between the retrospective and the non-retrospective position of Ivanov's discourse becomes more frequent and noticeable. Whereas initially the DIM lapses from the punctual present mainly into the evocative present with only occasional slips into the past tense: "Я приподнимаюсь и сажусь. Это делается трудно, когда обе ноги перебиты. Несколько раз приходится отчаиваться «-[summary effect – V.T.]» (28), toward the end Ivanov sounds more and more like a narrator. For example, here is how we learn about the appearance of some soldiers near the spot where the thinker is lying on the fourth day of his ordeal:

Совсем разбитый, одурманенный, я лежал почти в беспмятстве. Вдруг... Не обман ли это расстроенного воображения? Мне кажется, что нет. Да, это – говор. Конский топот,

людовой говор. Я едва не закричал, но удержался. А что, если это Турки? [...] А если это – наши? О проклятые кусты! Зачем вы обросли вокруг меня таким густым забором? [...] О проклятие! Я в изнеможении падаю лицом к земле и начинаю рыдать. [...] Могу ли я припомнить то оцепенение, которое овладело мною после этого ужасного случая? (35f)

After this last statement we seem to have definitely entered the realm of narrative, i.e., now Ivanov is looking back and reporting events after the fact. However, a few lines later, as the thinker looks at the decomposing Turk, we suddenly reenter the communicative situation of simultaneous discourse and experience: "Лица у него уже не было. Оно сползло с костей [...] «Это война, – подумал я, – вот ее изображение.» А солнце жжет и печет по-прежнему [...] Мириады червей падают из него. Как они копошатся!" (37)

The greatest amount of communicative ambiguity is created by the last sentence of the story. When Ivanov is rescued and loses a leg in the hospital, he says something that turns his whole DIM on its head and contradicts the entire preceding present-tense account: "Я могу говорить и рассказываю им все, что здесь написано." (38) At this point "Four Days" becomes a *paradoxical* form of discourse, since initially it clearly strives to synchronize discourse and experience but ends up cancelling out the DIM premise with the conventional retrospective position of a narrator. The fact that Ivanov's last statement is itself in the present tense underscores its contradictory implications. D. Cohn points out that "if we view the story in retrospect from this conclusion, if we view the story in retrospect from this conclusion, it now no longer appears as an autonomous monologue, but as a retrospective narrative cast entirely in an evocative present tense. In sum: a make-believe interior monologue, which gives away its sleight of hand only when its last sentence closes a sentence-thin frame of retrospection – *which was never opened.*" (1978, 204, italics are mine –V.T.). However, this complete and overt "narratorialization" of the text place only at the last moment. Until that point the reader is under the impression that this story is an attempt at creating a present-tense DIM. And as a result, two texts are created: the text initially read by the reader and then a second *post-lecturam* text, which is reassessed after the reading process is over. If a reader who has not yet finished "Four Days" is asked what genre this is, he is likely to answer: an early example of present-tense DIM. And this would be quite understandable, given passages like this one: "Голова кружится; мое путешествие к соседу [crawling over to the body of the Turk to get the dead man's water flask] меня совершенно измучило. А тут еще этот ужасный запах. Как он почернел ..." (32) That same reader will give a different reply after reading the last sentence of Garshin's story. This more than anything illustrates the communicative ambiguity of Garshin's text and the difficulty of "inventing" a genre. If we consider texts written later on, as the

DIM genre matured, e.g., E. Dujardin's *Les Lauriers sont coupés*, or A. Schnitzler's "Leutnant Gustl," there is no longer any hint of communicative ambiguity stemming from inconsistency in the thinker's temporal position with respect to the events in the main story-line.

The "struggle" between the punctual present tense and its retrospectively-oriented counterparts – the evocative present and the past tense – is part of a larger theoretical problem inherent in the DIM genre: scene versus summary. Norman Friedman was one of the first to raise the question of summary and scene, using these terms as antipodes: "Summary narrative is a generalized account or report of a series of events covering some extended period and a variety of locales [...] [while] scene emerges as soon as the specific, continuous, and successive details of time, place, action, character, and dialogue begin to appear." (1169).¹⁰ The key concepts here are "specific" and "continuous" because only a narrator looking back on events is in a position to avoid continuity and specificity by summarizing, i.e., by accelerating or condensing experience and giving only a partial account. Because a DIM thinker is merely registering his present experience, his verbalization of the "here and now" must be pure *scene*, since any hint of *summary* will destroy the illusion of simultaneous discourse and experience.

In Garshin's story there is a number of *scenes* related to one of the most immediate elements of the "here and now": the process of sensory perception. These sensory perception *scenes* are quite impressive attempts to create the illusion that the thinker is seeing or hearing something *in actu* and not in retrospect. For example, when Ivanov regains consciousness for the first time and thinks "Я лежу, кажется, на животе и вижу перед собой только маленький кусочек земли [...] [мой глаз] зажат чем-то твердым, должно быть веткою [...]" (27), we have the impression that we are looking at unprocessed or "raw" sensory data, i.e., Ivanov, not looking back on this event, has not had time to process his perception and to interpret it. The thinker's uncertainty as to what his position in space is ("кажется") and what is keeping one of his eyes shut ("чем-то") means that his discourse and experience are indeed intended to sound simultaneous. If Ivanov were at this point acting like a conventional narrator who sees this and other parts of the story in retrospect, he would know exactly what happened to him, since a few lines later we learn that he manages to turn his head, determine his bearings and sit up. Thus, a narratorial version of "я лежу, кажется, на животе" could be something like "я лежал на животе."¹¹

The illusion that we are witnessing perception *in actu* is especially striking when Ivanov first verbalizes the perception of an unprocessed sensory stimulus from the external world and only subsequently identifies it right in front of our

eyes. For example, here is a *scene* reflecting Ivanov's realization of why he has not been found by his regiment: "Надо мною – клочок черно-синего неба, на котором горит большая звезда и несколько маленьких, вокруг что-то темное и высокое. Это кусты. Я в кустах: меня не нашли!" (28) The elimination of retrospection is achieved here by breaking down the visual process into two stages: a) first Ivanov perceives "что-то темное и высокое," which is motivated by the fact that he is wounded and therefore disoriented, b) then is blurry vision comes into focus and he can identify the indistinct stimulus as "кусты." This "dissection" of sensory experience is precisely the "specific, continuous, and successive details" that constitute Friedman's idea of *scene* (cf. above). If Ivanov were looking back on this event, he would be more likely to say something like "надо мною были кусты." Thus, the use of the punctual present tense, coupled with this "imitation" of a thinker's perceptual process, creates a much more *scene* – like effect than anything possible even in figural narrative.

The protagonist's terrible physical condition and the resulting disorientation are used to motivate an even more elaborate *scene* where the perceptual process is broken down into three stages. Not only do we witness how the thinker registers a stimulus and then identifies it *in actu* as in the last example, but we are also privy to the process of mental reasoning, which takes place in between and leads to this identification. In the following example, this type of *extended scene* is used to create suspense and stress Ivanov's delirium and suffering: "Какие-то странные звуки доходят до меня ... Как будто бы кто-то стонет. Да, это – стон. Лежит ли около меня какой-нибудь такой же забытый, с перебитыми ногами или с пулей в животе? Нет, стоны так близко, а около меня, кажется никого нет ... Боже мой, да ведь это – я сам!" (29) Because the protagonist is not looking back on this event, we share that much more in his false hope of finding a fellow-sufferer, and we are that much more shocked by his realization that he himself is the source of these "стоны." Such a dramatic effect would be diminished by the retrospective position of a narrator who, now safe and sound, is merely *recalling* a terrible incident.

Discussing the use of Ivanov's wound as motivation for breaking down his perceptual process into separate stages for the purpose of a *scene* effect, P. Henry points out that "this 'impressionistic' device [...] demonstrates the senselessness of war and portrays a bizarre and unreal world [...]" (44) In other words, the ultimate result of such sensory perception scenes in "Four Days" is defamiliarization (остранение),¹² since the thinker's sensory experience suddenly becomes something very *strange*, and the world appears unfamiliar and frightening. Consequently, war is no longer a cliché of glorious, clean and most of all clear action; instead it is strange and unintelligible experience, into which the reader is introduced *in actu* and from the worst possible position: that of a wounded soldier agonizing alone under the scorching sun.

Even though Garshin use more than once the above-mentioned sensory perception *scene* device, his avoidance of narratorial *summary* and retrospection is not consistent. For example, when the thinker notices the Turk's body for the first time, the illusion of sensory perception *in actu* is partially compromised by the narratorial "я вижу" and "видны": "[...] я вижу что-то темное и большое, лежащее шагах в пяти от меня. Кое-где на нем видны блики от лунного света. Это – пуговицы или амуниция. Это – труп или раненый." (29) Any sensation – be it visual, olfactory, auditory and especially the feeling of pain – is rendered less immediate, less dramatic and therefore less *scene* – like, if it is introduced by "I see," "I smell," "I hear" or "I feel." Such an introductory statement is from the realm of a conventional narrator who is not verbally registering his perception as it occurs, but talking about it after the fact. Consequently, the framing phrase "Я чувствую" in "Я чувствую, как шевелятся корни волос на моей голове" (28) takes something away from the immediacy of perception and reduces its *scene* – like quality. We have the impression that if Ivanov has time to *introduce* the verbalization of this horrible feeling with "я чувствую", his hair is no longer "moving" at the moment of discourse.

In order to illustrate how much the *scene* effect suffers from such "framed" verbalization of perception, I would like to take advantage of Garshin's inconsistencies and quote a passage where framed and unframed perception alternate: "Однако становится жарко. Солнце жжет. Я открываю глаза, вижу те же кусты, то же небо, только при дневном освещении. А вот и мой сосед. Да, это – турок, труп. Какой огромный! Я узнаю его, это тот самый." (30) The first two sentences appear as immediate sensory perception registered by Ivanov's inner discourse *in actu* because they are unframed. His perception of the bushes, however, is more narratorial because of "вижу", especially when compared to the unframed and more *scene* – like "а вот и мой сосед." The latter, in its turn, is much more spontaneous than the last sentence, which once again returns Ivanov's discourse into a more retrospective position because of "я узнаю его." Such framed "узнавание" on the one hand takes something away from the illusion that his discourse and experience are simultaneous, and on the other "я узнаю его" appears redundant, since the recognition is dramatized by "это тот самый."

As with other devices, this type vacillation between the narratorial and the non-narratorial, the immediate and the retrospective, can be observed in quite a number of instances. For example, the discovery by Ivanov that the dead Turk has a water flask is very spontaneous and indirect: "Боже мой! Да у него в этой огромной фляге, наверно, есть вода!" (31) We appear to see the Turk's flask at the same moment as Ivanov does, and the exclamation "Боже мой!" stresses the fact that this is taking place *in actu*, thereby helping us share in the immediacy of Ivanov's discovery. Just as immediate is the verbalization of

Ivanov's sensations as he finally reaches the Turk and grabs the flask: "Наконец вот и он. Вот фляга ... в ней есть вода – и как много! Кажется больше полфляги" (31) However, when Ivanov feels terrible pain in his broken legs, a much more narratorial mode of discourse is used: "Я делаю движение и ощущаю мучительную боль в ногах." (28) Because the thinker's sensation of pain is framed by the narratorial "ощущаю," the intensity and immediacy of his anguish are diminished and "narratorialized."

It is especially when it comes to the verbalization of anguish and physical pain, that anything suggestive of a *summary*, such as the narratorial framing of sensations, is particularly detrimental to the illusion of simultaneity of discourse and experience. Because pain is such an overwhelming sensation, especially in the case of a seriously wounded person, as is Ivanov, anything suggesting *detachment* places the person who is supposed to feel pain in a retrospective position. When Ivanov is crawling toward the flask on the Turk's body, every moment causes him unbearable anguish: "И я ползу. Ноги цепляются за землю, и каждое движение вызывает нестерпимую боль. Я кричу, кричу с воплями, а все-таки ползу." (31) The fact that he can come up with an adjective to *describe* his pain means that at the moment of discourse the pain is unlikely to be that intolerable and appears to be recalled rather than experienced. Such detachment is suggestive of a retrospective position and therefore a *summary*, as opposed to a *scene*. As L. Stenborg puts it, "Man wird sich sagen müssen, daß es keine *naturgetreue* Wiedergabe ist, wenn ein Verwundeter, von seinen Schmerzen gelähmt, seinen Gedanken literarisch künstlerische Form geben kann, wie es hier geschieht." (128) But especially summary-like in this passage is the fact that Ivanov's screams are *reported* and not *dramatized*: instead of actually screaming something as spontaneous and immediate as "A!" or "Oj," Ivanov merely *tells* us that he is screaming, which only a retrospective narrator can do. After all, logically, it is only *after* the scream itself that one can say "кричу с воплями." The same can be said of "я прихожу в отчаяние и плачу" (35) or "я в изнеможении падаю лицом к земле и начинаю рыдать" (36) where: firstly, Ivanov's despair and exhaustion are made less vivid and intense by the fact that they are simply *referred* to and not dramatized and secondly, his crying is summarized, i.e., described, as in the case of the above-mentioned "кричу с воплями," instead of actually taking place before our eyes.

Narratorial framing is also present in those parts of Ivanov's DIM when he is not directly involved in sensory perception, i.e., when he remembers something or is engaged in a reasoning process. Shortly after regaining consciousness, Ivanov attempts to understand what has happened to him: "В ушах звон. Голова отяжелела. Смутно понимаю я, что ранен в обе ноги. Что ж это такое? Отчего меня не подняли? Неужели турки разбили нас? Я начи-

наю припоминать бывшее со мной, сначала смутно, потом яснее, и прихожу к заключению, что мы вовсе не разбиты." (28) The illusion of non-retrospection, resulting from spontaneity of sensation suggested by the unframed verbalization of the thinker's sensations in the first two sentences, is greatly compromised by the very narratorial "смутно понимаю я, что ранен." His discourse appears detached from the instant of "понимание" and this narratorial effect is compounded by the adverb "смутно," since this uncertainty is not reflected by the very clear formulation of this state. Instead of being dramatized as a *scene*, Ivanov's uncertainty about his physical condition is reported in the form of a *summary*, which can happen only in retrospect. However, the next three questions restore the illusion of simultaneous discourse and experience: we clearly have the impression that they race through the thinker's head *in actu*. But then his discourse is once more narratorialized by another framed realization: "прихожу к заключению, что мы вовсе не разбиты" (*italics mine* – V.T.).

The same inconsistency can be observed in Ivanov's verbalization of memories, which is sometimes framed and sometimes seems to be very immediate. For example, when the thinker recalls a particularly gruesome incident from his past, namely, the death of a small dog, his recollection is so framed that he appears to be telling a story as if there were an external addressee listening to him:

[...] скоро конец. Только в газетах останется несколько строк, что, мол, потери наши незначительны: ранено столько-то [...] убит один. Один рядовой, как та одна собачонка ... Целая картина ярко вспыхивает в моем воображении. Это было давно [...] Это была маленькая хорошенькая собачка; вагон конножелезной дороги переехал ее. Она умирала, вот как теперь я. Какой-то дворник растолкал толпу, взял собачку за шиворот и унес. (30)

The purely associative transition from Ivanov's thoughts of a possible newspaper account of his death, as well as the future tense used to verbalize this hypothetical article ("останется"), clearly indicate an attempt to place the thinker's discourse and experience into the same temporal plane. However, the framing phrase "целая картина ярко вспыхивает в моем воображении" actually ends up being the adverb "ярко": this vividness appears reported and not experienced. The narratorial detachment inherent in such framing is especially evident if we compare the last passage with another one where Ivanov returns to the incident with the dog after saying a mental farewell to his family: "Прощай, мать, прощай, моя невеста, моя любовь! Ах, как тяжело, горько! Под сердце подходит что-то ... Опять эта беленькая собачка!" (37) The suddenness of this unframed recollection, and especially the fact that it is in the form of an exclamation, do in fact create the impression that the image of the little dog *flashes* through the thinker's mind simultaneously with his inner discourse, i.e. *in actu*.

This is much more vivid ("ярко") and *scene* - like than the narratorial use of the actual adverb "ярко" in the above-mentioned "целая картина ярко вспыхивает в моем воображении."

The non-reportorial and therefore non-narrative effect produced by the exclamation "Опять эта беленькая собочка!" in Ivanov's above-mentioned second recollection of the incident with the crushed dog is part of a larger communicative phenomenon. Of the four basic sentence types-declarative/reportorial, interrogative, imperative and exclamatory (Shaw, 33-4) - the most common in conventional retrospective narration is the declarative/reportorial. V. Artyomov, for example, views the term "narrative" and "declarative/reportorial" as virtual synonyms: "почти бескрайнее разнообразие речевых поступков делится на четыре основных класса, так называемые коммуникационные типы: повествование, вопрос, побуждение, восклицание [...]" (58) And it is because of the firm association between the conventional narrative and the declarative/reportorial mode that the illusion of private communication, i.e., a non-narratorial communicative situation, is reinforced if declarative/reportorial utterances are *avoided* as much as possible. D. Cohn, in her discussion of Molly Bloom's DIM from J. Joyce's *Ulysses*, points out that:

[...] exclamation and interrogation [...] orient [Molly's discourse] away from a neutral report of the present moment, and away from the narration of past events. Since language-for-onself is by definition the form of language in which speaker and listener coincide, the technique that imitates it in fiction can remain convincing only if it excludes all factual statements, all explicit report on present and past happenings (1978, 222).

In much of Garshin's text this "neutral report of the present moment" appears to be the dominant form of the thinker's discourse. "Бледные розоватые пятна заходили вокруг меня. Большая звезда побледнела, несколько маленьких исчезли. Это восходит луна." (29) or "Солнце взошло. Его огромный диск, весь пересеченный и разделенный черными ветвями кустов, красен, как кровь. Сегодня будет, кажется, жарко." (34) Even though the punctual present tense is here clearly aimed at the synchronization of discourse and experience, and even though the use of the future in "сегодня будет, кажется, жарко" obviously excludes the possibility that the thinker is looking back on this experience, there is a sense that these sentences are not altogether private because they are declarative/reportorial. As a result, communicative ambiguity is created: on the one hand, as pointed out above, the simultaneity of discourse and experience excludes the presence of an external addressee and therefore implies self-communication, i.e., experience is not reported but merely

verbally registered by the thinker; on the other hand, because the declarative/-reportorial mode is normally associated with conventional narrative; i.e., a public form of communication, the presence of an external addressee is suggested.

However, in a number of instances Ivanov's discourse is "denarratorialized" by the use of the exclamations and questions. The extent to which this enhances the illusion of self-communication can be illustrated by the following example: "Я проснулся. Почему я вижу звезды, которые так ярко светятся на черном синем болгарском небе? Разве я не в палатке?" (28) Here we no longer feel that he is reporting anything; instead, such spontaneous utterances sound like *reactions* to immediate experience. Consequently, the mere presence of the stars appears to be taken for granted, as it presumably should be in self-communication where the addresser and the addressee are the same person (in narration they are not, and the narrator's job is to tell his addressee "what happened" and "what was there"). Instead, the focus of attention shifts to the *significance* of seeing stars in the thinker's mind: he did not expect to see them after regaining consciousness and clearly does not know where he is. Thus, we appear to learn only indirectly that Ivanov sees stars: this detail "leaks out" as secondary information, since the thinker is concentrating on its meaning. The fact that the thinker is in Bulgaria, is disclosed in the same indirect, non-reportorial fashion because it does not appear to be central in Ivanov's utterance. Similarly, later on Ivanov's terrible thirst is revealed in the form of a question followed by an exclamation: "За что меня мучает жажда? Жажда!" (31) As in the previous example, the reader seems to overhear that the thinker is thirsty, since, instead of *telling* about this thirst, Ivanov appears only to verbalize a spontaneous emotional *reaction* to this terrible sensation.

Because of their spontaneity, exclamations are an especially effective tool for disclosing information and yet avoiding the declarative/reportorial mode suggestive of conventional narrative. For example, upon seeing the Turk's body for the second time, Ivanov's discourse discloses the dead man's size indirectly: "А вот и мой сосед. Да, – это турок, труп. Какой огромный!" (30) The amount of water in the Turk's flask is also "picked up" by the reader as information not intended for anyone but the thinker: "Вот фляга ... в ней есть вода – и как много!" (31).¹³ Similarly, the Turk's decomposition, i.e., the smell and color of his corpse, is rendered not as a report, but as the thinker's emotional reaction to this horrible sight: "Голова кружится; мое путешествие к соседу меня совершенно измучило. А тут еще этот ужасный запах. Как он почернел ..." (32) Finally, the horror of sharing Ivanov's experience of watching a dead man decompose *in actu* is enhanced, as we learn indirectly that the worms in the Turk's body are swarming: "Он совсем расплылся. Мириады червей падают из него. Как они копошатся!" (37)

This fact that all the above-cited examples of indirect information disclosure include declarative/reportorial and exclamatory utterances side by side once again illustrates how much Garshin's text fluctuates between two mutually exclusive communicative premises; private and public communication or non-retrospective and retrospective discourse. Sometimes information is disclosed indirectly, and then, as if the author wanted to make sure that we understand what is going on, the thinker repeats the same thing in a reportorial fashion, i.e., relying on the declarative mode. For example, when Ivanov hears the sounds of a cavalry unit nearby, his inability to see the soldiers and to be seen by them because of the thick bushes all around is revealed at first in a way that excludes any type of report: "А что если это турки? [...] Сдерут кожу, поджарят раненные ноги ... [...] А если это наши? О проклятые кусты! Зачем вы обросли вокруг меня таким густым забором?" This, however, is immediately followed by essentially the same information, only in a more narratorial form: "Ничего я не вижу сквозь них [...]" (35 – italics a. m. – V.T.). The result is that we are first given Ivanov's frustration at the fact that he is hidden by bushes as a *scene*, i.e., it is dramatized, and then as a *summary*, i.e., it is reported. A few lines below, where Ivanov verbalizes his impatience at the fact that the soldiers are slow to come into his view, the same phenomenon can be observed: "Что ж они так долго не едут? Нетерпение томит меня" (35). Because Ivanov's discourse is still in the present tense, the effect of such a redundant summary/report is all the more paradoxical in relation to the protagonist's communicative position. And even though "нетерпение томит меня" sounds more like the evocative than the punctual present, "что ж они так долго не едут?" clearly places Ivanov in a non-retrospective position with respect to the events. Thus, DIM and narrative appear to cancel each other out or deny each other's existence.

There are actually two reasons for which the above-cited exclamation "О проклятые кусты! Зачем вы обросли вокруг меня таким густым забором?" creates the impression that instead of being *told* about the bushes around the thinker, we learn this fact by *overhearing* his *in actu* frustration at being blocked by these bushes from his potential saviors. In addition to the fact that the declarative/reportorial mode is replaced here by the exclamatory and the interrogative, this utterance is dialogic. Any form of dialogue – it does not really matter here whether a reply is given or even can be given, since we are still dealing with clearly direct address – by definition constitutes pure scene, and given the use of the punctual present tense, this scene is being verbalized *in actu*. As S. Rimmon-Kenan puts it, "a quotation of a monologue or a dialogue [...] creates the illusion of *pure mimesis* [scene – V.T.]," (110) which means that summary (diegesis) is excluded by the mere presence of direct "conversational" form. Therefore, dialo-

gic discourse in DIM reinforces the illusion of non-retrospection, i.e., of simultaneous verbalization and experience.

Furthermore, interior dialogue in DIM has another advantage. As I have pointed above, because conventional narrative, which is modelled on various forms of public communication, tends to be explicit, coherent and complete, DIM, which implies the absence of public communication, sounds more "realistic" if explicitness, coherence and completeness are avoided as much as possible. Any indication that the thinker's discourse is taking into account an uninitiated addressee (the reader) risks compromising the illusion of self-communication. However, when *interior monologue* is replaced by *interior dialogue*, the need for "difficult" discourse is greatly diminished because dialogue by its nature implies differentiation between an addresser and an addressee. In DIM interior dialogue suggests a temporary split in the thinker's mind, where discourse is no longer genuinely private, since something like a conversation is now taking place between *two* internal interlocutors. As J. Hawthorn points out,

[...] interior dialogue is much more formal than is interior monologue – otherwise the *characterization* of different *speakers* would not be possible. We find in it none of the characteristic deletions and abridgements of interior monologue; the *utterance* of interior dialogue could, generally, be transplanted into scenes of actual dialogue with little or no linguistic adaption (87).

In "Four Days" interior dialogue is used quite extensively, providing motivation for much of Ivanov's coherent, complete and explicit discourse and, at the same time, creating the *scene* effect aimed at synchronizing verbalization and experience. This dialogue takes a number of forms, which do not always imply an explicit internal interlocutor, but the lack of a clear "you" does not necessarily compromise the dialogic nature of the thinker's thought process. As J. Faryno points out, the "interlocutors" in dialogue can be any set of antipodal positions:

[...] наиболее распространенное представление о диалоге как о непосредственном обмене мнениями или информацией – это лишь одна из возможных форм диалога, она отнюдь не единственная. Эта форма диалога наблюдается лишь в некоторых специальных условиях. В таких, когда непосредственно сталкиваются друг с другом два или больше собеседника [...] [Однако], оппонентом не обязательно должен быть другой человек – им может быть просто иная система ценностей, иное языковое поведение, иная концепция, иное сознание (288).

The point here is that as long as we have the impression that the thinker's thought, instead of developing smoothly, progresses in the form of propositions

and *reactions* to these propositions, an interior dialogue is taking place. For example, as Ivanov tries to identify the Turk's body, both monologue and dialogue are present in his internal discourse. "Если бы он был раненый, он очнулся бы от такого крика. Это труп. Наш ли турок? Ах боже мой! Будто не все равно." (29) In the first two sentences his thought progresses in monologic form, i.e., one thought smoothly leads to another. However, the ending of his passage is in the form of a question and a hostile reaction to that question, i.e., it looks like an argument. Even though no clear "I" and "you" are given, the dialogic nature of this exchange reflects Faryno's idea that dialogue can be suggested by the presence of something like "иная система ценностей, иное языковое поведение, иная концепция, иное сознание" (cf. above).

The two *opposing positions*, as if belonging to two separate consciousness, implied by the above-cited brief internal exchange in Ivanov's DIM, are especially clear from the thinker's thoughts on the possibility of committing suicide in order to avoid further suffering. In the following passage we have the impression that two different individuals, who can be called the *optimist* and the *pessimist*, are arguing and "bouncing" ideas off each other in order to arrive at a plan of action:

Помнится, в «Физиологии обыденной жизни» [...] рассказана история самоубийцы, уморившего себя голодом. Он жил очень долго, потому что пил. Ну и что же? Если я и проживу еще дней пять-шесть, что будет из этого? [...] Все равно – умирать. [...] Не лучше ли кончить? [...] Так кончать или ждать? Чего? Избавления? Смерти? Ждать, пока придут турки и начнут сдирать кожу с моих раненых ног? Лучше уж самому... Нет, не нужно падать духом; буду бороться до конца, до последних сил. Ведь если меня найдут, я спасен. (32)

The presence of "ведь," a rhetorical conjunction normally aimed at persuading an interlocutor, in "ведь если меня найдут, я спасен" stresses the dialogic nature of this passage where the optimist and the pessimist disagree with each other, refute each other's arguments and even mock each other's respective positions. Such "socratization" of the thinker's thought process makes it possible to avoid the straight-forward narratorial *exposition* of ideas and suggest self-communication. Thus, interior dialogue not only helps to motivate coherent discourse in DIM, but also, as in the case of the above-mentioned reliance on the exclamatory and interrogative modes of discourse at the expense of the declarative/reportorial, reinforces the illusion of private communication by eliminating any possibility that the thinker is addressing a reader or any other public addressee, since he is clearly addressing himself in the form of "the other".

The presence of two opposing positions in Ivanov's DIM is motivated by the fact that the protagonist is suffering from a terrible sense of guilt at having just killed a human being: the Turk who is rotting a few feet away from him. His reassessment of such concepts as the enemy, military glory, patriotism, the legitimacy of war-time murder and war in general, at times takes the form of an internal polemic where a new ideological position appears to come into conflict with Ivanov's previously held idealistic notions. In the following passage one "interlocutor" appears to *condemn* the other:

Передо мною лежит убитый мною человек. За что я его убил? [...] Я не хотел этого. Я не хотел зла никому, когда шел драться. Мысль о том, что и мне придется убивать людей, как-то уходила от меня. Я представлял себе только, как я буду подставлять *свою* грудь под пули! И я пошел и подставил. Ну и что же? Глупец, глупец! а этот несчастный феллах [...] Чем же он виноват? И чем виноват я, хотя я и убил его? Чем я виноват? (30-1)

The form of this internal dialogic struggle taking place within the mind of a man who is trying to come to grips with a terrible realization corresponds to the third category in V. Rinberg's classification of interior dialogue types: "1) dialogue with an imaginary interlocutor, 2) dialogue with a present interlocutor, 3) polemic, i.e., «argument with oneself», 4) dialogue with the participation of voices from the past and 5) parallel dialogue ... [my translation – V.T.]" (34). The first, second and fourth categories are also present in Ivanov's DIM, and, as all instances of interior dialogue in "Four Days," they are used as devices aimed at dramatizing the thinker's *suffering*, i.e., creating the illusion that his anguish is experienced *in actu* instead of being recalled retrospectively.

A mix of "dialogue with an imaginary interlocutor" and "dialogue with a present interlocutor" is used in some instances where Ivanov mentally addresses either inanimate objects, his own feelings or the dead Turk. For example, instead of simply directly *reporting* that he is being tortured by memories of his past happiness, the anguish of reliving these recollections in the horrible context of the present is presented as a *scene* in dialogic form: "Вы, воспоминания, не мучьте меня, оставьте меня! [...] Ах тоска, тоска! Ты хуже ран." (30) As in the case of the above-cited "О проклятые кусты! Зачем вы обросли вокруг меня таким густым забором?" (35), the private communication effect is especially convincing because the interior dialogue form is coupled with the use of exclamations and interrogatives instead of declarative/reportorial language. And a similar denarratorialization of the thinker's discourse is achieved, when, instead of making statements about the dead Turk, Ivanov actually addresses him. "Ты спасаешь меня, моя жертва!" (31) is his thought when the protagonist suddenly discovers a flask full of water on the Turk's body, and the same dialogic form is

used to convey Ivanov's horror at the sight of the Turk's decomposing body: "Мой сосед – что станется с тобой? Ты и теперь ужасен." (34)

Because the above-cited examples of interior dialogue (illustrative of Rinberg's first and second categories) involve a form of direct address, i.e., a marked interlocutor, they are more dialogically explicit than the previously mentioned internal polemic (corresponding to Rinberg's third category). The presence of such a marked addressee further enhances all the above-mentioned effects created by interior dialogue in DIM. Even more dialogically explicit is a passage where Ivanov mentally addresses his mother and sister: "Мать моя, дорогая моя! Вырвешь ты свои седые косы, ударишься головою об стену, проклянешь тот день, когда родила меня, весь мир проклянешь, что выдумал на страдание людям войну! Но вы с Машей, должно быть, и не услышите о моих муках. Прощай, мать, прощай, моя невеста, моя любовь!" (37) This dialogic segment, which roughly corresponds to Rinberg's fourth category "dialogue with the participation of voices from the past" (cf. above), serves not only to dramatize the thinker's attempt to imagine what his mother will do when she learns of his death or to denarratorialize his final farewell to his loved ones. Its dramatic and spontaneous quality also enhances what is, after all, the prime purpose of Garshin's text: the anti-war message. This is clearly a thinly veiled anti-war outburst on the part of the author. However, the use of interior dialogue form, i.e., the illusion of self-communication, introduces the semblance of a *spontaneous* emotional outcry, thereby somewhat reducing the "preaching" effect created by these philosophical comments about war and making them more palatable to the reader.

We have pointed out that interior dialogue in "Four Days" motivates coherent, complete and explicit discourse in a genre where such linguistic clarity would otherwise compromise the illusion of *in actu* self-communication. And indeed, because Ivanov's DIM is by no means entirely dialogic in form and yet appears coherent, complete and explicit virtually everywhere, the self-communication premise is somewhat undermined at times. In accordance with the main premise of present-tense DIM, the inner verbalization of on-going experience must eliminate any suggestion of a retrospective stance by eliminating all hints of *discourse planning*. If we consider communication in general, the amount of discourse planning is normally a positive function of the time span separating the discourse and its referent. The assumption here is that the more time a speaker has to consider the referent, assess its significance and establish links between its constituent parts, the more coherent, sophisticated, complex and polished will be resulting verbalization. This is in fact confirmed by empirical studies of real-life communication. A number of researchers, such as E. Ochs and B. Kroll, have studied the differences between planned and relatively unplanned discourse by comparing

written discourse on the one hand and spontaneous oral discourse on the other. They have found that planned messages, which normally correspond to written discourse, are more complex, explicit and syntactically complete than relatively unplanned messages, which are usually found in spontaneous oral discourse. This difference is intuitively known to virtually all readers just from everyday experience. Therefore, given that a DIM thinker is supposed to be verbalizing *in actu* – and therefore, unlike a conventional narrator, cannot reconsider his discourse in retrospect – any sign of typical planned (and therefore written) discourse is bound to stand out as a violation of the DIM illusion. In other words, the more unpolished and fragmented is the inner discourse of a thinker in DIM, the greater the illusion of unplanned verbalization. As a result, passages, such as the following example from "Four Days" where the thinker finds himself in an army hospital after being found, look suspiciously too well-constructed and complex for non-retrospective and unprocessed discourse: "Надо мною стоят доктора, сестры милосердия, и, кроме них, я вижу еще знакомое лицо знаменитого петербургского профессора, наклонившегося над моими ногами." (38) It is especially the use of the participles "наклонившегося" that makes this passage look planned, since in Russian participles are much more typical of written texts rather than spontaneous oral discourse.

As this example illustrates, discourse planning or its absence are evident first of all from *sentence structure*. B. Kroll's observations indicate that

subordination in sentence structure is a 'planned' activity not occurring in speech or presumably *in interior monologue* [...] [and] we would expect that communication which is planned and allows time for encoding information in more "difficult" structures will exhibit a greater degree of combined ideas than communication which is spontaneous and encoded under pressure of time, which does not allow the communicator to use those combining strategies which require major manipulations of word order and sentence structure. (Quoted by R. Clines, 32, italics a. m. – V.T.)

If we juxtapose this assumption with certain instances of DIM in "Four Days," we discover a number of utterances, which imply a somewhat ambiguous communicative situation, since they are clearly in the punctual present tense, and yet their complexity betrays a certain amount of discourse planning, which suggests a retrospective position. For example, the following passage clearly features the "more difficult structures [that] exhibit a greater degree of combined ideas than communication which is spontaneous and encoded under pressure of Time" (cf. Kroll above): "Нужно повернуть голову и посмотреть. Теперь это сделать удобнее, потому что еще тогда, когда я, очнувшись, видел травку у муравья, ползущего вниз головою, я, пытаюсь подняться, упал не в прежнее положение, а повернулся на спину. Оттого-то мне и видны эти

звезды." (28) Even though the future-oriented first sentence and the present-oriented last sentence seem to indicate that experience and its verbalization are simultaneous, this effect is undermined by the second sentence, which is a very sophisticated compound-complex construction with such an intricate set of interdependent clauses that the suggestion of spontaneity is seriously in question. The planned nature of the second sentence is indicated not only by clause subordination but also by suspended syntax where constructions are temporarily interrupted by the insertion of phrases and even clauses. To a large degree this phenomenon corresponds to what R. Clines calls a periodic sentences:

[...] a periodic sentence is any sentence in which the completion of main clause subject and verb is postponed. Previous studies indicate that such a syntactic structure involves a greater level of *planned* activity and is a more complex syntactic unit than its counterpart – a *loose* sentence structure, where cumulative modifiers are added to the main clause after completion of the subject and verb (37).

Such planned utterances create an especially ambiguous communicative situation when there is an attempt to clarify the relationship between the various segments of the thinker's discourse. In particular, it is the illusion of private communication that suffers when Ivanov wakes up and thinks: "Я лежу с закрытыми глазами, *хотя* уже давно проснулся. Мне не хочется открыть глаза, *потому что* я чувствую сквозь закрытые веки солнечный свет: *если* я открою глаза, *то* он будет резать их." (29, italics a. m. – V.T.) The use of all these subordinate conjunctions allows for the possibility that Ivanov's discourse is intended not just for himself but also for *an external, uninitiated addressee* who might have difficulty establishing the relationship between "я открою глаза" and "он [солнечный свет] будет резать их" without "если" and "то."¹⁴ And although in a few instances Ivanov's DIM is made to sound more private by the use of short and unconnected phrases, e.g., "Я лежу в совершенном изнеможении. Солнце жжет мне лицо и руки. Накрыться нечем. *Хоть бы* ночь поскорее" (32), this "telegraphic" style is not prevalent enough to erase the discourse planning effect in most of the text.¹⁵

The needs of a contextually uninitiated external addressee are acknowledged in an even more obvious way when Ivanov inserts explanatory parenthetical comments designed to clarify a potentially ambiguous element. For example, when the thinker considers his guilt in the carnage of war and specifically in the murder of the Turkish soldier, a parenthetical explanatory comment is introduced to account – as if to someone else – for the protagonist's knowledge that the dead man is not an ethnic Turk but an Arab peasant (fellah) drafted into the Turkish army: "А этот несчастный феллах (на нем египетский мундир) – он вино-

ват еще меньше." (31) Similarly, when Ivanov comes back to the incident with the crushed dog after a short digression, he appears to be making sure that the reader does not get lost: "Унесет ли меня кто-нибудь? Нет, лежи и умирай. А как хороша жизнь!... В тот день (когда случилось несчастье с собачкой) я был счастлив." (30) The use of parentheses here results not only in a discourse planning effect because of clause subordination, but also indicates an attempt to explain the deictic phrase "в тот день." Deixes or indexicals – pronouns or adverbs of time and place – are signs, which require contextual knowledge on the part of the addressee to be deciphered. Because the addressee of DIM is also the addresser, "their" knowledge of context is always equal. Therefore, one would not expect the referents of deictics to be explained, especially in such an overt way, in private communication. As soon as we encounter such an explanation, we have the impression that the addresser is now taking into account the needs of an external addressee who may not know the context and therefore the referent of a particular indexical sign.

Equally explicative is the use of *verba dicendi* in the verbalization of external dialogue: he said, I said. Only a narrator, who is reporting a conversation in retrospect, must identify the interlocutors to his addressee (a reader), since the latter was not there and can therefore not be expected to know who said what. A DIM thinker verbalizing dialogue *in actu*, on the other hand, is his own addressee and consequently sees each interlocutor "right now." Thus, the use of *verba dicendi* becomes redundant in DIM and introduces an element of externally-oriented communication, i.e., narrative, into the illusion of internal communication. In "Four Days" there is very little external dialogue, since Ivanov is alone most of the time. However, toward the end he is found by his regiment, and his verbalization of external speech clearly narratorializes the situation and undermines the use of the punctual present tense: "Я вздрагиваю и разом прихожу в себя. Из кустов глядят на меня добрые голубые глаза Яковлева, нашего ефрейтора. «Лопаты!» кричит он." (37) The same effect is produced by exchanges between the protagonist and a doctor: "«Петр Иванович!» шепчу я. «Что, голубчик?»" (38). These, and other narratorial elements began to disappear from DIM as the genre developed after "Four Days." In E. Dujardin's *Les Lauriers sont coupés* there are already many instances of external dialogue with no *verba dicendi*, and in A. Schnitzler's "Leutnant Gustl" *verba dicendi* are absent altogether, resulting in exchanges such as the one taking place between the protagonist and a waiter in a café: "«Habe die Ehre, Herr Leutnant!» «Guten Morgen.» «So früh heute, Herr Leutnant?» «Ah, lassen S'nur – ich hab' nicht viel Zeit, ich kann mit'm Mantel dasitzen.» «Was befehlen Herr Leutnant?» [...]» (174)¹⁶

As I have pointed out, apart from a few instances of external dialogue, Ivanov is alone for most of the story. His isolation is not only a way of motivating his interior monologue, but also gives the thinker a chance to *rethink* the morality of war, which, after all, is the main point of "Four Days." In this respect, the story's form acts as a pretext for the presentation of Garshin's favorite anti-militaristic theme: "[...] the [typical] Garshinian hero ... is forced to be introspective, because he is usually faced with a moral dilemma [...]" In *Four Days*, for example, the events leading up to the murder [of the Turk] and the murder itself are dispensed with in one page. The story's significance lies in Ivanov's reaction to the murder, in his ponderings on war and death [...]" (Yarwood, 1981, 87). The fact that Ivanov is not only alone but also *immobilized* by his injury and therefore forced by circumstances to spend four horrifying days right next to the decomposing corpse of someone whom he has killed is undoubtedly an effective means of forcing the protagonist to come to terms with his guilt.¹⁷ Constantly reminded by the body next to him that he is a murderer, and unceasingly tortured by his physical anguish, Garshin's protagonist seems unable to think of anything but his current situation and its antecedents. However, this relentless focus on the present moment creates a problem: time span. When it comes to the disclosure of *in actu* experience, according to the DIM "eavesdropping" premise, events cannot be skipped or summarized since gaps and event summary are the prerogative of a narrator who, from his *retrospective* position, can manipulate information and condense it. A thinker can only verbally register all current experience, which is why the action in the main story-line of Dujardin's *Les Lauriers sont coupés* and Schnitzler's "Leutnant Gustl" spans only a certain number of hours. If an author intends to write a short text and yet wants the events of the story to cover more time than the period actually registered by the mind of his protagonist, he must resort to devices that would motivate such expansion.

In *Four Days* this problem is solved by having an injured thinker who keeps falling in and out of consciousness. This allows the author to skip long periods of time, which are indicated in the text by blank spaces and by the thinker's verbalization of his black-outs and reawakenings: "Опять мрак, опять ничего нет. [blank] Я проснулся." (28) or "Мысли путаются, и я забываюсь. [blank] Я спал долго [...]" (32) Consequently, even though the actual text of the story is quite short, Ivanov's anguish is prolonged and intensified, since he ends up spending four horrible days near death. This, in turn, increases suspense by augmenting our fear for the thinker's life: the *longer* he lies there untreated in the boiling sun, the greater is the likelihood of his eventual death. Furthermore, because Ivanov is lying next to the corpse of a man killed in war, the anti-war message of the story is enhanced by the above mentioned prolongation device, since the four days in the sun cause the Turk's body to decompose gradually

before the horrified protagonist's eyes. The graphic description of the description of the decomposition process, along with all the associated guilt and fear in Ivanov's mind, show the horror of war in its full "glory": "Он совсем расплылся. Мириады червей падают из него. Как они копошатся! Когда он будет съеден и от него останутся одни кости и мундир, тогда – моя очередь. И я буду таким же." Ivanov's extended anguish, the reader's uneasy suspense – made all the more vivid by the "here and now" premise of the text – and the maximized shock effect generated by the intermittent graphic descriptions of the decomposing Turk made war appear so unpleasant to Garshin's contemporaries and demystified its "glorious" reputation so much that "Four Days" was withdrawn by the Ministry of Public Education from schools and public libraries for being antipatriotic (Henry, 52).

However, just as with other DIM devices, time prolongation is used inconsistently in this story. There is no attempt to dramatize the actual black-out and awakening *process*, since "Мысли путаются, и я забываюсь. [blank] Я спал долго [...]" (32) fails to convey the loss of consciousness and its recovery as a *scene*: the thinker sounds too composed and alert, i.e., too much like a narrator looking back on the experience. In order to see how the DIM genre developed after Garshin in this respect, let us compare this to the dramatization of awakening in *Les Lauriers sont coupés* and in "Leutnant Gustl" respectively. Here is how Dujardin's thinker wakes up after a brief dream and realizes that he is still in the company of his friend Léa: "Ah!!! mille épouvantements!!! quoi? ... on me pousse, on m'arrache, on me tue ... Rien ... un rien ... la chambre ... Léa ... Sapristi ... m'étais-je endormi? ..." (94). Schnitzler's protagonist, who has fallen asleep on a park bench, awakens even more dramatically: "Was ist denn? – He, Johann, bringen S'mir ein Glas frisches Wasser ... Was ist? ... Wo ... Ja, träume ich denn? ... Mein Schädel ... o, Donnerwetter ... Fischamend ... Ich bring' die Augen nicht auf!– Ich bin ja angezogen! – Wo sitz' ich denn? – Heiliger Himmel, eingeschlafen bin ich!" (166). It is this dramatized confusion of semiconscious states that is missing in "Four Days." As a final note, it ought to be mentioned that, just as in Garshin's story, in "Leutnant Gustl" the thinker's sleep is used to extend the time period covered by the story: the protagonist's "nap," which moves the story a few hours ahead in order to make the development of events more believable, is motivated by the fact that Gustl ends up on a park bench in the middle of the night, feels understandably tired and therefore dozes off.

My analysis of illusion-making devices in Garshin's "Four Days" has yielded a picture of communicative ambiguity. In some instances the text clearly seeks to create the impression that *histoire* and *discourse*. However, Garshin did not yet appear to be comfortable with the new form, which caused his thinker's DIM to

slip into retrospectively-oriented discourse, i.e., narrative and therefore *summary*. And yet, this should by no means diminish the author's accomplishment, for he seems to have made a genuine attempt to make us *share* the experience of a dying soldier instead of just reading about it. By seeking to synchronize discourse with experience in "Four Days" the author essentially tries to move the reader as far away as possible from the artificiality of reading and as close as possible to the genuineness of living. In this connection, it is noteworthy to cite R. Pascal's comment regarding

Satre's critique of the traditional form of the novel, the chief falsity of which lies in the narrator (personal or impersonal), who writes from the standpoint of the outcome of the events related, and who thereby profoundly distorts the nature of real experience. The whole pattern of a story, the coherence of its events, is built on this false premise of retrospection, for it is only in retrospect that we can recognize events to be significant or irrelevant and contingent. The nature of living, which Satre powerfully illustrates from the experience of participating in the Resistance during the war, is quite opposite to that of fiction, since when acting we never know the outcome, we are unsure of effects, and we ignore what is happening elsewhere [...] (40)

"Four Days" is really the first attempt to recreate the "nature of living" as opposed to "that of fiction." By striving to avoid "this false premise of retrospection" and to create the illusion that Ivanov is "acting" and not narrating, the author appears to be trying to make us feel – however inconsistently – that, just like the terrified protagonist, we too do not "know the outcome, we are unsure of effects, and we ignore what is happening elsewhere" (cf. Pascal above). *Ecce bellum*, i.e., war not as it is *described* but as it is *lived*, and it is not about glory and motherland, but about bodies rotting and being eaten by worms – right now, and not back then. Given the public reaction at the time of this story's publication (cf. above), Garshin's innovative technique must have achieved its purpose. And whatever we may feel today about the shock value of "Four Days", at the very least we can recognize the potential of present-tense DIM to make discourse come to life.

Notes

- ¹ I would like to thank Larissa Tumanov and Aage Hansen-Löve for their helpful suggestion in the preparation of this essay.
- ² D. Bickerton argues that "indirect interior monologue is inner speech rendered in free indirect speech" (238). For a discussion of free indirect discourse/speech cf. D. Cohn, 1969 and A. Staube.

- 3 Other notable examples of this genre are E. Dujardin's *Les Lauriers sont coupés*, V. Larbaud's "Amants, heureux amants" and *Mon plus secret conseil* and A. Schnitzler's "Leutnant Gustl" and "Fräulein Else".
- 4 The idea that narrative, especially first-person or personal narrative, borrows its communicative form from non-fictional communicative situations, such as the memoirs, historiography etc., is raised by a number of critics. Cf. M. Glowinski, M.L. Pratt, R. Ohmann.
- 5 P. 28. All subsequent page references to this edition will appear in parentheses after quotations.
- 6 This implies that present-tense DIM lacks the starting point of all first-person narrative: the epic situation, a term used by B. Romberg to designate the particulars of the narrative act itself and its motivation. *Epopoia*, the Greek origin of the term "epic," means "telling" or "narrating" in verse, and present-tense DIM excludes *epopoia* - along with the epic situation - by excluding the public communication protomodel so fundamental for *epopoia* in particula and all narrative in general.
- 7 The exception is a fictional narrative in the form of a diary found by someone else after its author's death. The person who finds such a diary becomes a framing narrator who *presents* the second-order text. This is precisely the case in Garshin's other anti-war story, "The Coward," ("Trus") written two years after "Four Days" (in 1879). Most of the text consists of a diary kept by the protagonist who is about to be drafted. When he leaves for the Russo-Turkish War, the diary ends, and the story is finished by an impersonal narrator who first refers to the above-mentioned diary and then tells about its author's death in battle.
- 8 An example of DIM thinker dying and thereby ending the DIM is found in A. Schnitzler's "Fräulein Else" where the heroine is contemplating suicide. These are the delirious protagonist's last words. As she dies after having poisoned herself with an overdose of Veronal: "Ich fliege...ich träume...ich schliefe... ich träu...träu-ich flie..." (526).
- 9 As A. Danto points out, "any narrative is a structure imposed on events, grouping some of them together with others, and ruling some out as lacking relevance [...]" (132)
- 10 Clearly in DIM these terms are related to Friedman's dialogue category, since this genre consists of nothing but (inner) discourse.
- 11 Any similar restriction of a conventional narrator's field of knowledge and retrospective distance would bring us into the realm of figural narrative - perception filtered through the mind of the experiencing self - which represents a step toward the communicative position of a DIM thinker.

- ¹² This, according to V. Shklovsky's famous article, is a device used in literature to de-automatize our perception of very familiar and therefore often overlooked phenomena in order to make us notice them or see them from a different perspective.
- ¹³ The use of ellipses here may be a way of implying the passage of time that it takes Ivanov to open the flask and determine how much water is inside, i.e., this is a scene-creating device, which suggests that we are observing real time, as opposed to the condensed time of narratorial summary.
- ¹⁴ In this respect the following comments by E. Ochs regarding planned and unplanned discourse in real-life communication are especially illuminating: "In using context, the communicator does not make the semantic relation between the propositions explicit. For example, if the communicator produces the sequence I don't like that house. It looks strange, he does not specify the links between these assessments ... Our observations of discourse indicate that context is an alternative to syntax and that planned and unplanned discourse differ in their utilization of the two alternatives. Syntax makes the semantic link explicit, for example, *I don't like that house, because it looks strange*. It is relied upon more heavily in planned versus relatively unplanned discourse" (66).
- ¹⁵ The complexity and length of sentences in Dujardin's *Les Lauriers sont coupés*, a DIM written ten years after "Four Days," is already considerably reduced, resulting in much more "believable" syntax. The following fragmented verbalization of Dujardin's thinker dressing is indicative of the development of the genre. "Une chemise blanche; hâtons-nous; les boutons des manches, du col; ah! le linge frais; que je suis bête! dépêchons-nous; dans ma chambre; ma cravate; mes bretelles sont laides, je les ai affreusement choisies; mon gilet; dans la poche, ma montre, ma jaquette ..." (65)
- ¹⁶ The indirect indication of action – the waiter's attempt to take the protagonist's coat – is another sign of how the DIM genre developed after Garshin.
- ¹⁷ As D. Cohn points out, the restriction of a monologist in a small physical space is a very convenient device because "the perfect adherence to unity of place ... creates the condition for a monologue in which the mind is its own place: self-centered and therefore self-generative to a degree which can hardly be surpassed." (1978, 222.) Also cf. E. Yarwood, 1981, 88.

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